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I.   INTRODUCTION
In the 1971 United States Supreme Court decision Richardson v.
Perales,1 Justice Blackmun couched the majority ruling on the right
to cross-examine reporting physicians in social security disability
claim hearings in an elaborate, complex sentence that perplexes
analysts of its blackletter content and spawns conflicting interpreta-
tions of its subsequent bearing on cases in which cross-examination
is requested. In a triumph of verbosity over clarity, Justice Black-
mun stated:
We conclude that a written report by a licensed physician who
has examined the claimant and who sets forth in his report his
medical findings in his area of competence may be received as
evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character
and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence of
opposing direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant
himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a find-
ing by the hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the
claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting
physician and thereby provide himself with the opportunity for
cross-examination of the physician.2
On the one hand, Justice Blackmun referred to the cross-
examination of the reporting physician as the claimant’s “right.” This
suggests that the only precondition to obtaining a subpoena to cross-
examine a reporting physician is to duly request it, which the claim-
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1945; LL.B., Columbia University, 1949; Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley,
1953. I am indebted to my research assistant, Alex Ramirez, for his immensely helpful con-
tributions and initiatives in preparing this Article.
1. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
2. Id. at 402.
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ant in Perales did not do. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun, in
his “thereby” clause, states that the plaintiff merely has an “oppor-
tunity” for cross-examination. This statement seems to suggest that
the claimant’s “right” to cross-examination is not absolute. Does a
claimant’s “right” trump his “opportunity,” or does Justice Black-
mun’s convoluted statement mean that a claimant’s “opportunity” for
cross-examination modifies or supplants his “right?”
In the aftermath of the Perales decision, federal appellate courts
initially acted compatibly with the view that cross-examination, once
duly requested, was a right.3 But in 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in Cal-
vin v. Chater4 and Flatford v. Chater,5 upheld the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA’s) rejection of the claimants’ requests for
cross-examination.6 The Sixth Circuit maintained that the Supreme
Court’s formulation of the Perales rule did not create an absolute
right to cross-examination once requested.7 In the June 1998 decision
Yancey v. Apfel,8 the Second Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit’s in-
terpretation of the Perales rule. In Yancey, the court concluded that
the implementation of the claimant’s opportunity for cross-
examination is properly contingent upon the claimant’s showing that
a subpoena and cross-examination are necessary to the full presenta-
tion of the case.9
This Article examines the alternative readings and rationales of
Perales regarding the cross-examination of reporting physicians in
social security disability claim hearings. First, Part II compares the
Sixth and Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Perales rule, which
supports the SSA’s regulation and interpretation, to the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation, which explicitly proclaims cross-examination,
                                                                                                                      
3. See, e.g., Lidy v . Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a claimant
has the right to cross-examine the physician if a subpoena had been requested); Coffin v.
Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that a claimant must be given the opportu-
nity to cross-examine a witness who submits a report); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding a due process violation because the claimant was not permitted to cross-
examine an expert after requesting such permission); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding a due process violation because the hearing judge substantially relied on
the doctor’s report and the claimant was denied the right to cross-examine the doctor); Fi-
gueroa v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 585 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that
even though the claimant made no request to cross-examine, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) should, out of fairness, ask an unrepresented claimant if he has any questions for the
witness).
4. 73 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996).
5. 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
6. See Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92; Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1300.
7. See Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92; Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1300.
8. 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
9. See id. at 113 (finding that issuing subpoenas in social security cases is governed
by 20 C.F.R § 404.950(d)(1)). The Social Security Administration’s regulations provide that
“[w]hen it is reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case, an administrative law
judge . . . may, . . . at the request of a party, issue subpoenas for the appearance and testi-
mony of witnesses . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1) (1998).
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once duly requested, to be an absolute right. Part III questions
whether the Perales Court’s declaration that the SSA is “an [impar-
tial] adjudicator and not . . . an advocate or adversary”10 remains
empirically valid. Part IV discusses the SSA’s recent assertions of
management prerogatives that constrict the decisional independence
of the SSA’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Part V questions the
Sixth and Second Circuit’s draconian predictions that physicians will
be unwilling to participate in social security proceedings if they are
required to submit to cross-examination. Currently, this prediction is
conjectural and unaccompanied by authoritative data. Finally, Part
VI concludes that cross-examination of reporting physicians in SSA
hearings is an absolute right. I would not object, however, to a
reformulation of the SSA’s regulation that would make granting
claimants’ requests for cross-examination of physicians mandatory,
unless the ALJ finds that such cross-examination would be superflu-
ous or dysfunctional.
II.   JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
AS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT
A.   The Sixth Circuit
Two 1996 Sixth Circuit decisions challenge the Perales interpre-
tation supporting the notion that claimants for Social Security In-
come benefits have an absolute right to cross-examine reporting phy-
sicians. First, in Calvin v. Chater,11 a unanimous panel reversed the
district court’s ruling that the claimant had an absolute right to sub-
poena and cross-examine a physician who provided a pre-hearing re-
port.12 Instead, the court insisted that a claimant’s opportunity to
subpoena and cross-examine a physician would be granted only upon
a timely showing that both are “reasonably necessary for full presen-
tation of the case.”13 I will refer to this treatment as the “Calvin Ap-
proach.” The panel conjectured that if the physician had been sub-
poenaed to testify at the hearing that led to the denial of petitioner’s
claim, it was unlikely that the physician would have recalled the
medical examination which took place more than two years before
the hearing.14 Based on this reasoning, the court found that the phy-
sician’s testimony was not reasonably necessary.15 Moreover, despite
the principle that due process requires that a claimant be given an
                                                                                                                      
10. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
11. 73 F.3d 87 (6th Cir. 1996).
12. See id. at 88.
13. Id. at 91.
14. See id. at 92.
15. See id. at 92-94.
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opportunity to cross-examine the individuals who submit reports, the
court found that an agency charged with issuing regulations is not
“constitutionally precluded from prescribing reasonable and proper
requirements.”16
Seven months after the Calvin decision, another Sixth Circuit
panel, comprised of Judges Martin, Batchelder, and Oliver, solidified
and expanded the Calvin Approach and applied it to doctors who
provide post-hearing evidence.17 Convinced that precisely drafted in-
terrogatories would have met the claimant’s need for any additional
information, the panel concluded that the ALJ’s decision denying the
claimant a subpoena was not an abuse of the ALJ’s discretion.18 The
panel also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Calvin Ap-
proach violates a claimant’s right to procedural due process.19
Notwithstanding the definitiveness of its conclusion, the panel
acknowledged that deciding whether the ALJ abused his discretion
in denying cross-examination was a “close call” because the ALJ
asked for the doctor’s testimony after the hearing.20 The panel also
recognized that a heightened danger exists when evidence is gath-
ered post-hearing because the claimant may not have the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the physician.21 Finally, the panel acknowl-
edged that the inconvenience or expense of traveling to the hearing
site an additional time may discourage the claimant from requesting
a supplemental hearing.22
Despite the existing dangers, the court maintained that a sup-
plemental hearing was not necessary even though the doctor failed
to satisfactorily answer a “minimal number of questions.”23 Although
an ALJ’s withholding of interrogatories requested by a claimant
could raise concerns, the court reasoned that enough information
was obtained from the doctor through several sets of interrogato-
ries.24 Thus, the court concluded that the ALJ had not abused his
discretion in denying the subpoena.25 In coming to this conclusion,
the court reasoned that the ALJ remained an impartial decision
maker throughout the proceeding and had not failed in aiding the
                                                                                                                      
16. Id. at 93. The panel concluded its ode to SSA prescription of preconditions to sub-
poenas and cross-examination with “[s]ee generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 . . .
(1976).” The often-invoked Mathews criteria for determining what process is due are con-
sidered infra note 39.
17. See Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996).
18. See id. at 1307.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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claimant in the full development of his case.26 Furthermore, the
court disregarded the questions to which the doctor was unrespon-
sive because these questions were few in number and were poorly
drafted.27
The Flatford panel put a premium on Perales’s reference to “op-
portunity” for cross-examination and proceeded to hone “opportu-
nity” semantically and situationally until it was reduced to a privi-
lege to petition the ALJ for an exercise of the latter’s discretion.
Thus, the panel ruled that courts must uphold ALJ exercises of dis-
cretion regarding physician cross-examination absent a claimant’s
proof of bias or an abandonment of impartial decision making.28
On the other hand, the panel discounted Perales’s reference to a
claimant’s “right” to subpoena and cross-examine a physician be-
cause the Supreme Court did not discuss whether this right was ab-
solute or limited. The panel found that the Perales Court’s language
concerning this “right” was merely dicta.29 The remaining question is
whether the Sixth Circuit transmuted “opportunity” and “right” from
enforceable mandates to gummy homilies or from entitlements to
dicta.
B.   The Second Circuit
In a tightly reasoned departure from the thrust of the Second Cir-
cuit’s previous rulings on the cross-examination of physicians, the
Second Circuit endorsed and allied itself with the Sixth Circuit’s
conclusion in Flatford.30 In Yancey v. Apfel,31 the panel, comprised of
Judges Miner, Parker, and Dearie, ruled unanimously that a claim-
ant does not have an absolute due process right to subpoena a re-
porting physician and the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in refus-
ing the claimant a subpoena to cross-examine the physician.32
Prior to Yancey, the Second Circuit explicitly ruled that ALJs
violated the Due Process Clause by relying on evidence the claimant
had not been allowed to challenge or rebut.33 The Second Circuit
                                                                                                                      
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1305.
30. See Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998).
31. 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
32. See id. at 114.
33. See, e.g., Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the ALJ
denied due process after the ALJ failed to allow the claimant to challenge evidence on
which the ALJ based his ruling); Treadwell v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that basing a decision on uncorroborated hearsay evidence and the failure to grant
and enforce a subpoena violated the claimant’s due process rights); Gullo v. Califano, 609
F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the ALJ’s reliance on a post-hearing report with-
out authorizing the claimant to examine or challenge that report violated due process).
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swerved from this approach by finding that the issue of whether a
disability claimant has an absolute right to subpoena a reporting
physician was an issue of first impression in the Second Circuit.34
The Yancey panel deemed that the issue was not explicitly at issue in
the earlier cases.
Asserting that she had an absolute right to subpoena a reporting
physician,35 the Yancey claimant further contended that the par-
ticular circumstances of her case, including the facts that contradic-
tory medical evidence was presented and that diagnosing systemic
lupus erythematosus (SLE) is difficult and complex, warranted
cross-examination.36 The Second Circuit, however, gave the claim-
ant’s assertions short shrift; the panel conjectured that cross-
examination would have elicited only “redundant information.”37
In ruling against the claimant, the panel echoed the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of Perales’s “right to subpoena” rule by reiter-
ating that the Supreme Court failed to address with specificity the
issue of whether this “right” was limited or absolute.38 The Yancey
panel then proceeded to draw on the Supreme Court’s analytical
framework for measuring procedural due process, as set forth post-
Perales in Mathews v. Eldridge,39 and expanded its view of Mathews
by adopting a rule against establishing an absolute right to subpoena
physicians.40
Utilizing the Mathews analytical framework, the Second Circuit
in Yancey, similar to the Sixth Circuit in Flatford, concluded that
cross-examination of reporting physicians is not crucial to the fair-
ness and accuracy of the ALJ’s decision.41 Furthermore, the panel
maintained that the danger of inaccurate medical information or bi-
ased opinions was not great enough in this case to suggest that the
claimant would be denied benefits wrongly without the chance to
cross-examine the doctor.42 Given the fact that the reporting physi-
cian failed to find that Yancey suffered from SLE, the panel con-
cluded that the doctor’s testimony and cross-examination would have
                                                                                                                      
34. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 111.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 113.
37. Id. at 113.
38. See id. at 112.
39. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Supreme Court established three factors to deter-
mine whether an administrative procedure is constitutionally sufficient: (1) the nature and
magnitude of private interests affected; (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest” and the “value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3)
whether the “additional or substitute procedural requirement” would financially or admin-
istratively burden the government. Id., quoted in Yancey, 145 F.3d at 112 n.8.
40. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 113.
41. The panel maintained that the nonadversarial nature of SSA adjudications reduces
the need for cross-examination, which is essential to fairness in adversarial settings. See id.
42. See id.
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been redundant and of no use to the ALJ in making his determina-
tion.43
In considering whether due process mandated the cross-
examination of reporting physicians, the Yancey panel enveloped its
decision within a framework that focused on whether the Commis-
sioner’s decision was justified by substantial evidence in the record
or by an empirical probing of the relationship between the Mathews
factors and the Yancey facts. The panel emphasized that courts
should not reverse a ruling “[w]here an administrative decision rests
on adequate findings sustained by evidence having rational proba-
tive force.”44
If granting a subpoena and cross-examination would have led to
an altered assessment of whether substantial evidence justified the
Commissioner’s conclusion, then denial of cross-examination could
have been construed as a denial of due process. However, the panel
found that the record indicated no reason for determining a lack of
substantial evidence; the claimant had no proof that cross-
examination would have produced testimony transcending “redun-
dant information.”45
III.   THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S RULING THAT CROSS-EXAMINATION
IS A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS
In Lidy v. Sullivan,46 the Fifth Circuit issued the most definitive
and dispositive ruling regarding the right to cross-examination. The
panel, comprised of Judges Gee, Smith, and Weiner, asserted
unanimously that the “better reading” of the Supreme Court’s Pera-
les language is that it grants claimants an absolute right to subpoena
reporting physicians.47
In Lidy, the SSA argued that the Perales decision limits the
claimant’s right to subpoena and cross-examine reporting physicians,
and used the SSA’s regulations to bolster this argument.48 To support
this interpretation, the SSA relied on language from Perales that ex-
pressed a concern about “the cost of providing live medical testimony
. . . where need has not been demonstrated by a request for a sub-
poena.”49
                                                                                                                      
43. See id.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 114.
46. 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990).
47. See id. at 1077.
48. See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d), which authorizes the ALJ to decide whether
the requested cross-examination is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a
case”).
49. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971)).
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The panel, however, rejected the SSA’s interpretation of this lan-
guage and maintained that the language is unclear as to whether the
request should purport an adequate showing of need—the interpre-
tation undoubtedly supported by the Secretary—or the mere “filing
of a request ipso facto constitutes a demonstration of need.”50 In-
stead, the Lidy panel maintained that the Supreme Court’s reference
to the “right to subpoena” confers the right to cross-examine upon
the claimant if the claimant requests a subpoena.51 As a result, the
court concluded that the claimant need not show whether cross-
examination was “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of
the case,” as the SSA’s regulation provided.52 Thus, according to the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Perales, the claimant has an absolute
right to have her request granted.53
The Fifth Circuit panel added frosting and controversy to its cake
by remarking in conclusion, “We are persuaded, as well, by the fact
that all of the circuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue
read Perales as conferring an absolute right to subpoena a reporting
physician.”54 Although the other circuits’ decisions on which the Lidy
panel relied were by no means incompatible with its ruling, the Lidy
panel was distinctive in insisting that compliance with the SSA’s
regulation should not be examined at all by the court because cross-
examination is explicitly an absolute right.55
To no avail, then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr and his staff
made elaborate legal and policy arguments for the Supreme Court to
                                                                                                                      
50. Id.
51. See id. (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 402).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. (citing Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. Bowen, 869
F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1988); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1984); Figuroa v. Secre-
tary, 585 F.2d 351 (1st Cir. 1978)). The panel’s evaluation of the Wallace case was overtly
challenged as erroneous by then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr in the government’s peti-
tion for certiorari. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.5, Lidy v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
959 (1991) (No. 90-1344). The Solicitor General was partially correct in that the Wallace
panel recognized that compliance with the SSA’s regulation was a necessary subject of in-
quiry by the courts. See Wallace, 869 F.2d at 191. The ruling and comments of the panel,
however, overtly contradicted the SSA’s stance that it legitimately denied cross-
examination in the case. See id. at 194. The panel ordered the Secretary to afford the claim-
ant the right to cross-examine the physicians whose opinions had been received post-
hearing. The court added: “We disagree with the Secretary’s evaluation of the utility of
cross-examination in such a situation. Effective cross-examination could reveal what evi-
dence the physician considered or failed to consider in formulating his or her conclusions . . .
and whether there are any qualifications to the physician’s conclusions.” Id. at 192. Thus,
while recognizing that cross-examination is properly contingent on being necessary to the
full presentation of the case, the panel ruled that the threshold of necessity perceived by
the district court did not coincide with that of the SSA and that, in this instance at least,
“the ALJ must afford the claimant not only an opportunity to comment and present evi-
dence but also an opportunity to cross-examine the authors.” Id. at 193.
55. See Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
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grant certiorari. The fifteen-page petition for certiorari argued that
the issues at stake were of substantial significance to the proper ad-
ministration of the federal disability benefits program and to federal
administrative actions generally.56 According to the Solicitor Gen-
eral, the Fifth Circuit’s holding: (1) “threatens to impose enormous
financial and procedural burdens on a program under which millions
of claims are filed every year;”57 (2) “failed to apply the three-part
analysis of due process requirements articulated by this Court, and
applied by the Court to Social Security Act eligibility determina-
tions, in Mathews v. Eldridge;”58 (3) “failed to consider whether an
‘absolute right’ to subpoena and examine reporting physicians would
materially alter the risk of erroneous eligibility determinations and
whether such a right would unduly and inefficiently burden the ad-
ministrative process;”59 (4) “concluded that the due process right of a
disability applicant to subpoena and examine reporting physicians
had been established . . . as a direct holding in its decision in
Richardson v. Perales,” and “misapplied this Court’s decisions and
has created a conflict with the decisions of other courts of appeals;”60
(5) “erroneously cited Wallace v. Bowen as support for its holding;”61
(6) “mistakenly read Perales to require that subpoenas be granted
without a demonstration of ‘need’;”62 and (7) “will inevitably cause
confusion and inefficiency in the national administration of the fed-
eral disability benefits program” and “should therefore be resolved
by this Court.”63
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lidy case on June 3,
1991.64 Effective December 31, 1991, the SSA agreed to accept the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling on cross-examination in all cases issued out of
that circuit.65
                                                                                                                      
56. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Lidy (No. 90-1344).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7-8.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 13 n.5. In Wallace the Third Circuit held that due process requires that ALJs
allow subpoenas “when such cross-examination is necessary to the full presentation of the
case.” Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1988).
62.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Lidy (No. 90-1344).
63. Id. at 14.
64. See Sullivan v. Lidy, 500 U.S. 959, 959 (1991). Justice White cast one vote for cer-
tiorari.
65. Notice of Acquiescence, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625, 67,625 (1991). The SSA specified that
this ruling applies only to cases involving claimants for disability insurance benefits and/or
supplemental security income payments based on disability who reside in Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, or Texas at the time of the proceedings at the disability hearing, ALJ, or Appeals
Council levels. In such cases, when a claimant requests that a subpoena be issued for the
purpose of cross-examining an examining physician prior to the closing of the record, the
adjudicator must issue the subpoena. See id.
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IV.   THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGENCY ACQUIESCENCE
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S RULING?
The predictions of draconian consequences that inevitably will en-
sue if cross-examination of physicians is upheld as an absolute right
are puzzling.66 I asked a sample of social security practitioners in the
Fifth Circuit to comment on the effects of the SSA’s acquiescence in
the Fifth Circuit’s Lidy ruling. The sample was not scientifically
drawn. Instead, I randomly selected fifteen practitioners who have
varying ranges of experience in the social security context and with
whom or whose work I had no prior knowledge.
I addressed the following letter to the selected practitioners:
Dear:
As part of an ongoing research project regarding the right to
subpoena an examining physician for cross-examination purposes
in social security cases, one of my students came across Social Se-
curity Acquiescence Ruling 91-(5) which states that when a claim-
ant requests a subpoena for cross-examination purposes, the ad-
judicator must issue the subpoena. See 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625. This
ruling which is limited to the Fifth Circuit is contrary to the
SSA’s policy elsewhere that a claimant’s right to subpoena is
qualified. See C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1)(2).
In order to better understand what kind of impact this ruling
has had in the Fifth Circuit, I would greatly appreciate any com-
ments or reactions you may have regarding this ruling. I am par-
ticularly interested in any thoughts you may have on the following
issues:
1. The chilling effect, if any, on the number of physicians
willing to provide medical advice to the ALJ due to the
possibility of being subject to cross-examination as sug-
gested by Judge Martin in Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d
1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996); and
2. The effectiveness of cross-examination in social security
cases.
I would be most grateful for any feedback regarding the above
mentioned issues. Thank you in advance for your help.
Sincerely Yours,
I received seven responses to this letter, six of which are quoted
below. The seventh was unresponsive. Although certainly not dis-
positive of the issue, none of the respondents perceived any chilling
                                                                                                                      
66. Without citing any empirical evidence, the Sixth Circuit in Flatford asserted that a
consequence of an absolute right to subpoena would be that “the number of physicians
willing to provide medical advice to the administrative law judge would drop.” Flatford v.
Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit echoed the Sixth Circuit and
concluded that “practical concerns” about financial and administrative burdens “strongly
militate against . . . establishing an absolute right to subpoena reporting physicians.”
Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
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effect on doctors’ willingness to participate or any adverse effects on
SSA or ALJ efficacy. Cross-examination was not deemed necessary
or desirable in all cases; it was valuable for enhancing specificity in
the record and for accessing, confronting, or excluding nebulous or
biased reports.
Typical of the responses were these by practitioners in Texas and
Louisiana, to which I assigned numbers to preserve confidentiality.
1. I spoke with Administrative Law Judge ______, as to the ex-
perience the ALJs in the ______ Office have had in regard to
subpoenas of consultative examiners. He indicated that be-
tween ten percent and fifteen percent of the cases will have a
subpoena issued for the consultative examiner to be cross-
examined.
I have perpetuated a social security practice for a number of
years and have found that the same doctors appear from time
to time at the different hearings. I have found that the courts
are much more likely to look closely at the regular treating
physicians who have had hands-on care of the claimant, along
with test results and laboratory findings over a period of years
rather than the one-time examining physician’s findings. I find
all too often that the examining physicians hired by the State
Disability Determination Division will be requested to give
their opinion; however, they are not provided with the money
to do necessary X-rays, MRIs and other objective tests which
would help the doctors to get a better determination of just
what is going on with the claimant’s impairments. Also, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to learn just which of the medi-
cal records have been sent to the consultative examiner prior
to the examination to give him information to predicate the
examination he is giving.
2. The Social Security Administration, through the various
state Disability Determination Services, procures “consulta-
tive” medical examinators of, I would guess, a majority of
claimants. ALJs also employ “medical advisors” who typically
appear at the hearing, listen to the testimony and offer opin-
ions regarding the listings and medical assessments of mental
and physical limitations. The former groups are primarily the
target of a claimant’s subpoena.
I do not believe subpoena power in the Office of Hearing and
Appeals (OHA), where my practice is centered, has a chilling
effect on their willingness to conduct examinations for the
agency. Actually, OHA has no real mechanism for the issuance
of a subpoena. The ALJ simply calls the doctor and politely
asks him to appear at the hearing. I have requested the ap-
pearance of examining physicians on several occasions because
the interpretation of their medical assessments could be the
difference between and award or denial of benefits. I generally
assume an ALJ will interpret a vague medical assessment to
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deny benefits. The examining physicians want Social Security’s
business and, I believe, do better examinations and write
clearer reports when they may have to account for them in
court.
3. First, I believe there has been no “chilling effect” on the will-
ingness of physicians to perform disability examinations for
the Social Security Administration, as a result of this ruling. I
have been practicing social security disability law for more
than twenty years, and physicians who are willing to perform
consultative examinations for the government in social secu-
rity disability cases, are more plentiful now than they ever
have been in the past. Of the many factors that influence phy-
sicians’ willingness to participate in this system, the impact of
the Lidy decision and Social Security Agency Regulation 91-(5)
is so small as to be negligible. I would bet that subpoenas are
requested in well under one percent of all cases heard by ALJs
in the Dallas, Fort Worth and Houston areas where I practice,
and probably throughout the Fifth Circuit. Even when we do
request subpoenas, they are rarely issued, despite Lidy, for a
variety of reasons, e.g. the ALJ may have decided on his own
that the opinion of the doctor for who a subpoena was re-
quested is not reliable. Also, subpoenas issued by ALJs are not
enforceable, and it is time consuming and cumbersome to ob-
tain an enforceable subpoena. It may be more expeditious to
simply obtain another examination.
In cases where we have succeeded in obtaining cross-
examination of a consultative physician, the outcomes have
varied. We have had a number of cases in which physicians
who had submitted written reports that appeared adverse to
our clients, ended up giving testimony that was extremely
helpful to our cases. In other cases, the cross-examination did
not alter an adverse outcome. Of course, there are other ways
to measure “effectiveness of cross-examination” aside from
whether it alters the outcome of the decision. The social secu-
rity disability adjudication system is a system of “mass jus-
tice” in which the economics of providing consultative exami-
nation services to the government sometimes results in abbre-
viated, shoddy examinations and poorly written reports. Some
physicians become so dependent upon the government for
sending them large numbers of these cases that they may lose
their objectivity altogether.
4. I have practiced social security law for the past eight years,
almost exclusively for the past five years. In my experience an
examining physician is rarely cross-examined. On those few
occasions where I have requested that the examining physician
be subpoenaed, the physician greatly resisted the subpoena to
the point where the ALJ struck the report from the record and
scheduled a new consultative examination. Obviously I feel
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that all practitioners use the subpoena power very limitedly
and only where an examining physician’s report is so contrary
to the remaining evidence of record that it has not had a chill-
ing effect on physicians.
5. I customarily invoke the rule of the Lidy decision for two
reasons:
(a) To block the use by the Social Security Admini-
stration of evidence provided by a particular ex-
amining physician.
(b) To seek to exclude the reports of consulting physi-
cians whose reports demonstrate significant bias
against social security claimants.
With respect to your question about the “chilling effect” on
physician, I do not believe there is one. In those instances
where subpoenas are issued in my cases, the subpoenas are
routinely ignored by the physicians. Because of the weak and
cumbersome enforcement process, the only effect of the sub-
poena, as a practical matter, is to furnish the grounds for a
motion to exclude the doctor’s report or records. This motion is
usually, although not uniformly, granted.
In sum, in my practice the physician subpoena is usually a
tactical tool, which is issued with the expectation that the phy-
sician actually will not appear and testify.
6. First, I have no information whatsoever about any chilling
effect on the number of physicians willing to provide medical
advice to the ALJ. It appears to me that a more important fac-
tor leading to a low number of Disability Determination Serv-
ices physicians is the perceived “small fee” paid to physicians
and psychologists. Most medical experts testifying at my cli-
ents’ hearing are retired physicians.
Second, the effectiveness of my cross-examination of the tes-
tifying doctors at the hearing seems directly related to the
ALJ’s willingness to let me do a complete cross-examination. It
seems that many of the newly hired ALJs view the medical ex-
perts and/or consultants as someone they are supposed to pro-
tect from my questions. Other, more experienced ALJs let me
do whatever cross-examination I feel is appropriate to the case.
From my perspective, the Fifth Circuit has turned from an
occasionally claimant-oriented court in the 1960s to an almost
wholly defense-oriented court. It rarely, if ever, finds in favor
of a claimant.
Lastly, my rare experiences with requesting a subpoena from
an ALJ have produced variable results. Mostly the ALJs will
issue the subpoena. Sometimes they ignore my request. Whey
they ignore my request, about half the time I interpret this to
mean that they are leaning toward finding the client disabled
and do not want to go through the bother of subpoenaing a con-
sulting physician, and the client usually wins.
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These responses strongly suggest that the negative conjectures
shared by the Second and Sixth Circuits and the Solicitor General
regarding the effects of allowing physician cross-examination as an
absolute right should not be admitted as credible unless and until
clear and convincing empirical support can be found in the record to
validate them.67
The Mathews factors68 for determining the dimensions of due pro-
cess required in particular cases should not be transformed into in-
struments of hyperbole and exaggeration. They warrant and require
concrete factual data as measurements of the risks of erroneous dep-
rivations of claimants’ interests and of the fiscal and administrative
burdens on governmental interests. In addition, there should be con-
tinuing awareness that governmental interests extend beyond effi-
ciency and integrity. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Goldberg
v. Kelly,69 “From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has
been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders.”70 Mathews did not dispute Goldberg’s point that affording
people their rights and entitlements are means by which “important
governmental interests are promoted.”71 Indeed, Mathews arguably
alluded to these governmental interests in affording people their
rights and entitlements by specifying “the function involved” as a
component of governmental interest.72
V.   SHOULD THE “NONADVERSARIAL” STATUS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AFFECT THE AVAILABILITY OF CROSS-EXAMINATION?
In Perales, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the nonadversarial
nature of social security proceedings warrant greater informality
and flexibility in the presentation and evaluation of evidence as sup-
port for accepting hearing evidence of physicians as substantial evi-
dence when the claimant failed to subpoena the reporting physician
for cross-examination.73 Justice Blackmun maintained that typical
reporting physicians have no interest in the outcome of the proceed-
ings beyond professional curiosity.74 Only Justice Douglas, in dissent,
                                                                                                                      
67. These responses are by no means conclusive enough to prove that the SSA’s acqui-
escence of Lidy produced no chilling effects on doctor’s participation, no enormous escala-
tion of the financial costs, and no incursions on efficient administration of the system.
68. See supra note 39.
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
70. Id. at 264-65.
71. Id. at 264.
72. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-
66).
73. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
74. Justice Blackmun described the typical medical reports as “routine, standard and
unbiased,” id. at 404, and maintained that the “specter of questionable credibility and ve-
racity is not present,” id. at 407.
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echoed the challenge by Perales’s counsel to the SSA’s claim of
nonadversariality.75 Perales’s counsel argued that the government is
being unrealistic when it maintains that a disability hearing is not
adversarial; in actuality, the presiding officer gathers evidence, de-
cides which evidence to present, and seeks to strengthen the gov-
ernment’s case as much as possible.76 Justice Douglas scoffed at the
fairness of the SSA’s practices in using “circuit-riding” doctors’
claims without submitting them to cross-examination.77
To condition the grant or denial of cross-examination on whether
or not proceedings may aptly be termed “nonadversarial” rewards
form over substance. The rationale for cross-examination that Dean
Wigmore phrased with such eloquence and grace depends not at all
on the adversariness of the forum, but on the substance of its reli-
ance and reliability for credible evidence. As Wigmore stated:
For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of
evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-
examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safe-
guard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to
that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no
statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testi-
mony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has
found increasing strength in lengthening experience.78
To predict with certainty what gaps or gaffes cross-examination may
identify would be a fruitless or fictional assignment. As Roy Reardon
makes clear: “Conducting an effective cross-examination always in-
volves instantaneous interplay with the witness. It is therefore im-
possible to read a cross-examination out of a ‘black loose-leaf book’ or
to adhere rigidly to a formal outline. Spontaneity is essential . . . .”79
Granted, there may be and are occasions when counsel abuse the
right to cross-examination by endless, repetitive questions or efforts
to substitute brow-beating and intimidation for inquiry. That is
when presiding officers have the authority and duty to call a halt.
But to require a claimant to prove, as a condition of obtaining a sub-
poena, that cross-examination will assure production of evidence not
available by interrogatories or other written inquiries destroys cross-
examination’s primacy as a safeguard of accuracy. The hurdles
blocking access to cross-examination serve as shields against physi-
cians’ accountability for the specificity and validity of their reports.
                                                                                                                      
75. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. See Brief for Respondent at 27, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (No.
108).
77. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
79. Roy L. Reardon, Cross-Examination “To Sin or Not to Sin,” 25 LITIG. 30 (1998),
available in WESTLAW, 25 NO. 1 LITIG. 30, at *2.
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The Sixth and Second Circuit panels maintained that the SSA
appropriately placed the discretion to grant or deny subpoenas and
cross-examinations in the hands of SSA’s ALJs and that ALJ deci-
sions should be reversed in such matters only for abuse of discre-
tion.80 The exercise of discretion requires independence of SSA deci-
sional directives, but any assumption of ALJ freedom from SSA deci-
sional direction needs reexamination today in light of continuing as-
sertion of the SSA’s “managerial” authority, which includes prescrip-
tions for decision making.
The SSA has declared, and not yet repudiated, that ALJs must
adhere in their decisions to the SSA’s policies, notwithstanding court
decisions to the contrary. Unless SSA management decides to acqui-
esce in a court’s holding (as the SSA did after the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the Lidy holding of the Fifth Circuit), ALJ deci-
sion making is bound by SSA’s policies and SSA’s interpretation of
the applicable law.81 By insisting explicitly that “[a]n ALJ is bound to
follow SSA policy even if, in the ALJ’s opinion, the policy is contrary
to law,”82 the SSA denigrates the decisional integrity and commit-
ment of the ALJs to the rule of law and subordinates their profes-
sional judgment to the politically fueled policies of SSA manage-
ment. ALJs who might have the temerity to adhere to the court’s
rulings that contravene SSA policies are warned by the General
Counsel that “[a]long with the authority to set these policies, of
course, goes the authority to ensure that these policies are carried
out and, where appropriate, i.e. where a factual basis exists, to disci-
pline ALJs for violations of such policies.”83
Given rulings by the circuit courts of appeals affirming that ad-
ministrative agencies “are required to abide by the law of this Circuit
in matters arising within the jurisdiction of this Circuit until and
unless it is changed by this court or reversed by the Supreme Court
of the United States,”84 it is difficult to avoid labeling the General
Counsel’s instruction to ALJs as a requirement to engage in con-
tempt of court. If the SSA believes that its policy choices can, with
impunity, challenge and trump circuit court rulings, it is disingenu-
                                                                                                                      
80. See Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296
(6th Cir. 1996).
81. See Social Security Administration General Counsel Memorandum, Legal Founda-
tions of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing Process and its Applicability to Administra-
tive Law Judges 5-6 (Jan. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States Dep’t. of Energy v. FLRA, 106 F.3d 1155, 1165 (4th Cir. 1997) (Lultig, J., con-
curring)); see also Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 135 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
FCC must abide by the Eighth Circuit’s rulings, reasoning that the FCC is not an equal of
the court and the court has the ultimate duty to determine what the law is).
1999]                         RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE 1065
ous at best for it to argue concomitantly that its mode of operation is
nonadversarial and, hence, is entitled to exercise greater flexibility
and informality in decision making. Vis à vis circuit court judges, its
own ALJs, and claimants petitioning for benefits, the SSA is about as
nonadversarial as whiskey is nonalcoholic.85 The time is ripe to reaf-
firm that the right to cross-examination is an integral component of
fairness in constitutional and administrative adjudications. This
right should not be truncated or compromised by meretricious pre-
tenses of nonadversariality.
VI.   CONCLUSION
Legal education teaches us to be wary of absolutes such as “al-
ways” and “never.” Notwithstanding my preference for cross-
examination of physicians as an absolute right, I recognize the po-
tential for abuse at the fringe through needless and wasteful dupli-
cation or pedantry. Consequently, I could support a reformulation of
the SSA regulation on cross-examination that affirms and asserts
the right of claimants to cross-examine physicians but also author-
izes ALJs, for good cause found, to suspend or deny cross-
examination where clear and convincing evidence in the record war-
rants the conclusion that the testimony sought is or would be irrele-
vant, dysfunctional, or unduly repetitive. The important difference
between the present regulation and my suggestion lies in the burden
of proof. Whereas the SSA currently places the claimant in the posi-
tion of a mendicant who must prove to the SSA’s satisfaction that the
cross-examination is necessary, my suggestion would recognize the
claimant’s right to cross-examine the reporting physician unless the
clear and convincing threshold of proof to the contrary has been met.
                                                                                                                      
85. I have suggested steps toward a collegial, rather than the present hierarchical ap-
proach, in the SSA’s relationships with ALJs. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Toward Heighten-
ing Impartiality in Social Security Agency Proceedings Involving Administrative Law
Judges, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ALJ’S 58, 68-71 (1998). For a searing critique of the SSA’s “un-
usually informal administrative model,” see Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The
Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceed-
ings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997).
